![]() They were written a mere three years apart. Even from the brief selections that you read from these two works, the differences between them should have been evident to you. So what I want to do in today’s lecture is to contrast some of the themes, which we encountered last lecture in the context of Rawls’s Theory of Justice by looking at a particular famous chapter of his colleague Robert Nozick’s work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Perhaps because at the core of Rawls’s picture lies a notion of justice, whereas at the core of Nozick’s picture lies a notion of rights. But they differ profoundly in what sort of state they end up calling legitimate. Both of them are concerned with the fundamental question which we first encountered in the context of Hobbes: how could it be that it’s legitimate to have a state? Both of them are concerned with structuring the state in such a way that it doesn’t violate that which is perceived as being on their picture as inviolable. ![]() So there’s something extraordinarily interesting going on in this pair of works. Any state more extensive than the minimal state violates people’s rights.” “Individuals have rights and there are things that no person or group may do to them without violating those rights.” And he goes on to say that “the minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, the enforcement of contracts and so on is the most extensive state that can be justified. So he says in the opening of the preface, the first sentence which you read for today. But rather than seeing the core of that inviolability as lying in some notion of justice, he sees it as lying in a notion of rights. Nozick is also concerned with a kind of inviolability. So Rawls is concerned with an inviolability of humanity based on a notion of justice. Each person, says Rawls, “possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.” For this reason, says Rawls famously in these opening pages, “justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others.” It plays the role with regard to the legitimacy of an institution that truth plays with regard to the legitimacy of a system of thought. So you’ll recall that when we were reading the Rawls–for some reason the remote is not working, that’s a pity but there we go–you’ll recall that when we were reading the Rawls, Rawls began his text by speaking of justice as the first virtue of social institutions. And the best way to get a sense of the project in which we will find ourselves engaged today is to contrast the opening pages of Rawls’s Theory of Justice with the opening pages of Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Professor Tamar Gendler: So the topic of today’s lecture, as you can see from the title, is liberty. 10).Philosophy and the Science of Human Nature PHIL 181 - Lecture 22 - Equality II 7, Section 2) and other arguments attempting to justify more than the night-watchman state (Ch. I shall thus not address his discussions of Rawls' theory of justice (Ch. Below I shall focus only on his core argument. The argument is complex, and Nozick often inserts long-and very interesting-digressions. The other is that nothing more extensive than the night-watchman state is legitimate, except with the consent of all. ![]() One is that a night-watchman state (which protects only against violence, theft, fraud, and breach of contract) could be legitimate, even without the consent of all those to be governed. At the core of Nozick's book are two arguments. This all changed with the publication of Rawls's articulation and defense of liberal egalitarianism and Nozick's libertarian challenge to the legitimacy of anything more than the night-watchman state. Moreover, to the extent that normative theories were considered, utilitarianism was the center of attention. For much of the preceding half-century, under the influence of logical positivism's heavy emphasis on empirical verifiability, much of moral philosophy was taken up with meta-ethics (e.g., the semantics of moral discourse)-with little attention given to normative moral theories. Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), along with John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971), radically changed the landscape in analytic political philosophy.
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